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The rate of switching between providers in the electricity retail market provides information
on the participation of consumers in the market activities and on the effects of liberalization
(CEER, 2015; Yang, 2014). The study of switching determinants is, therefore, important to both
policy making and policy evaluation. The paper adds to the vast literature that investigates
the determinants of switching behavior (see Section 2) by pointing out three aspects that are
overlooked in the existing analyses.
Firstly, we introduce a new definition of household. We show that, although switching
affects the household as a whole, the determinants of this choice depend on the characteristics
of the individuals that belong to the same household (e.g. age, working status, education).
To characterize the household in terms of the features of all its components we adopt, for the
first time in this literature (Table 8 in Appendix A), a parametric Bayesian mixed Logit model.
Secondly, we consider regional heterogeneity as a factor that influences switching determinants.
Finally, we take into account the choice context by introducing information on the structure of
the market.
We analyze the switching choice in the Italian retail electricity market, several features of
which contribute to make the investigation interesting. The market is hybrid in that the free
market coexists with a regulated one and the country exhibits a pronounced regional economic
and social heterogeneity. Our analysis exploits the Aspects of Daily Life survey (ADL) car-
ried out in 2014 by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). We observe social,
demographic, geographic and economic information regarding 18,448 households and 37,217
individuals.
Results show that the identification of the switching determinants depends on the definition
of the household. By including the features of all the household members, we find that the access
to the Internet positively affects the switching probability and that the concentration rate of
the market has a negative impact on the switching activities. Moreover, we find significant local
effects: the determinants of switching behavior vary according to the household’s macro-region
of residence. We conclude that the instruments deployed to achieve an efficient liberalized
electricity market (also by promoting retailer switching) should be sufficiently differentiated so
as to reflect the countries’ distinct situation and their within-country heterogeneity.



































































illustrates the research hypotheses and Section 4 expounds the methodology. Section 5 briefly
describes the Italian retail electricity market while Section 6 introduces data and variables.
Section 7 presents the results, Section 8 discusses and concludes.
2 Background and Literature Review
Switching behavior has been extensively studied from different perspectives, from marketing
(Keaveney, 1995; Peng and Wang, 2006) to industrial organization (Joskow, 2008). This section
identifies the main switching determinants and frames our contribution within the literature
(Table 1).
Electricity Price The price of electricity and the associated savings are, in principle,
decisive factors in switching decisions. Indeed, it is natural to think that, since electricity is
an undifferentiated good, the only difference perceived by consumers is price (Gamble et al.,
2009). However, the high share of transmission costs and taxes generally leaves the retailer
little margin for price competition. It follows that price differences among retailers are often
negligible and savings from switching are very small in comparison to the income of the average
household (Sirin and Gonul, 2016). Consequently, incentives to undertake costly searches for
better contracts and cheaper tariffs are low (Giulietti et al., 2014; Klemperer, 1995; Wieringa
and Verhoef, 2007).
There is additional evidence showing that households pay little attention to relative prices
or tend to underreact to price changes (He and Reiner, 2015). For instance, Vesterberg (2018),
in exploring switching between fixed and variable-price electricity contracts, finds little reaction
to price changes. Finally, switching costs are negatively correlated with switching (Sirin and
Gonul, 2016; Wieringa and Verhoef, 2007). He and Reiner (2015) show that consumers may
tolerate perceived high prices offered by the incumbent when switching costs are perceived
as high. Evidence on the impact of the economic status, mainly income, is mixed. Ek and
Söderholm (2008), Gamble et al. (2009), and Rowlands et al. (2004) find that households with
a higher income tend to switch more. Interestingly, Giulietti et al. (2005) and Fontana et al.
(2018) find that lower income households tend to consider switching more than households with
higher income but are not as likely to switch as the latter.
Individual Rationality Doubts have been cast on individual rationality in making the



































































declares that a switching decision is uniquely driven by price reasons, is nevertheless unable to
fully appropriate the available gains (see also Annala et al., 2013). Limitations to rationality
have also been evidenced by Wieringa and Verhoef (2007). According to their analysis, an
increase in the number of available contracts results in a reduction of the switching rate due to
difficulties in ranking options.
Demographic features Education is often found to have a positive effect on switching (Ek
and Söderholm, 2008; He and Reiner, 2015; McDaniel and Groothuis, 2012; Rowlands et al.,
2004). Men are more likely to switch than women according to Gamble et al. (2009) and the
activity in the market decreases with age in the findings of Rowlands et al. (2004) and Fontana
et al. (2018), whereas He and Reiner (2015) show that both gender and age are irrelevant to
switching.
Psychological traits Psychological traits, such as loyalty to the current retailer (often
the previous monopolist), are also found to have a negative effect on active behavior (Daglish,
2016; Gamble et al., 2009; Szymanski and Henard, 2001). Similarly, risk aversion also negatively
impacts the switching behavior (Schleich et al., 2017; Sirin and Gonul, 2016). Switching in other
markets seems to reduce the effect of psychological and informational barriers (Fontana et al.,
2018; Giulietti et al., 2014; Wirtz et al., 2014) and this has the potential to encourage the
switch in the electricity market, since consumers learn how to compare and choose better offers.
Similarly, consumers that change retailers in other utilities and are satisfied with their choice
are more likely to switch in the electricity market as well (McDaniel and Groothuis, 2012). On
the contrary, the hypothesis that shifting retailer in various markets would entail a process of
learning how to compare offers finds no confirmation in Defeuilley (2009). Features such as
the satisfaction with the service and a high quality customer relationship management have a
negative effect on the probability of switching (Wieringa and Verhoef, 2007; Yang, 2014) while
service failures have a positive effect (Keaveney, 1995).
Quality and quantity of information The quality and quantity of information about
the service is considered a factor encouraging switching: a higher amount of information is
commonly associated with more active and efficient consumers (Flores and Waddams Price,
2018; Fontana et al., 2018; Gärling et al., 2008; Hortaçsu et al., 2015; Loi and Le Ng, 2018) and
vice-versa (He and Reiner, 2015).
Other determinants Studies on Japan (Shin and Managi, 2017), Sweden (Gärling et al.,



































































positive effect on switching. Finally, political events are found to impact on switching. He and
Reiner (2015), in a survey on British households, find that voting intention is highly correlated
with switching behavior. Namely, Labour voters were the most likely to switch out of all political
party supporters. This result is possibly explained by the emphasis that the Labour party was
giving to the issue of energy bills at the time in which the data were collected (2013-2014).
Table 1: Here
Table 1 shows that our analysis adds two categories of determinants – Local effects and Market
structure – to previous analyses of switching behavior. The hypothesis that differences in market
and institutional frameworks should be included in the study of energy markets was set forth
by Monarca et al. (2015) in the context of the integration of renewable energy sources into
electricity markets. This hypothesis is easily extended to switching behavior and to the related
policy implication that a “one-size-fits-all” policy approach may work.
3 Research hypotheses
While the literature mainly focuses on the features of the decision makers (Table 1), we argue
that the structure of the market also affects the switching decision. For instance, the number
of retailers and their market shares define the set of opportunities available to consumers.
Moreover, a more concentrated market results in a weakest competition and, therefore, in
a lower level of benefits that derive from switching. Hence, we argue that a higher market
concentration should result in lower switching rates (Hypothesis I).
Studies on switching are commonly conducted at the national or local level (Table 8 in
Appendix A), however the characterization of the institutional, geographic and cultural context
of choice is not explicitly considered among switching determinants. We maintain that the place
of residence of the household (e.g. city, region, macro-region) embeds the local context features
(habits, economic development, provision of services) and, as a consequence, affects switching.
It follows that, if the context of choice is heterogeneous, the switching determinants might vary
even within the same country (Hypothesis II).
In the literature (Table 8 in Appendix A), the unit of analysis is either the household
characterized by the attributes of the contact person (hereafter, HCP) or the individual without
references to the family (hereafter, IN). We claim that the decision to switch is determined by



































































in the analyses (Hypothesis III).
In order to test these hypotheses, we explicit an econometric model for the electricity retailer
switching probability with individual and household specific covariates. This approach differs
from the extant literature since it attributes each individual to his/her household (hereafter,
HH). We consider economic, demographic, and informational variables with the addition of a
local index of market concentration (Hypothesis I and II), a macro-region and a size of the
municipality of household residence (Hypothesis II). In order to corroborate our hypotheses, we
compare estimates with local effects with the ones at the country level, while estimates with
HH are compared with the ones with HCP.
We estimate the switching probability (j = 1) of individual r in household k, namely πkr =
Pkr(j = 1|xkr), according to covariates xkr = [i h m]kr through the following model:
logit(πkr) = α+ x
′
krβ + u = α+ i
′βi + h′βh +m′βm + u, (1)
where i, h, m identify, respectively, the vectors of individual, household and market covariates
characterising individual r in household k. Similarly, βi, βh, βm are the associated vectors of
fixed effects, while u is a household k random intercept.
The next section expounds the adopted methodology.
4 Methodology
We represent the household decision as a binary choice: switch or non-switch. Hence, the
household response is a random variable equal to 1 if the household switches and equal to 0 if
it does not switch.
A closed form for the choice probability, obtained considering a Logit model (Luce and Sup-
pes, 1965; McFadden, 1974), is widely used in the literature to model the household switching
decision (Table 8 in Appendix A). Its implementation allows us to align with the previous find-
ings and to compare them with our approach. This fixed effects econometric model explains
switching behavior at the household level when only one of its members is considered (HCP).
However, our hypothesis is that switching is a household decision and that the household
should be characterized as the bundle of features of its members (HH). To this purpose, we
use individual level data to extend the Logit model. It is worth noting that it is not possible



































































decision makers, since they share the same household decision. Therefore, we add a random
grouping effect, formally a household intercept, to aggregate members of the same family and we
adopt the more general mixed Logit model (MLM). In more detail, the HH is characterized by
the individuals that share the same household id. The latter is used as the grouping variable
to cluster errors and to define a specific random intercept (see Appendix B for specification
details).1
The mixed Logit model is considered a flexible model that approximates any random utility
model (McFadden and Train, 2000) and that overcomes the main limitations of the standard
Logit model (e.g. it allows for random taste variation, unrestricted substitution patterns, and
correlation in unobserved factors; see Train, 2003). We reinterpret the mixed Logit model in a
Bayesian framework to exploit the presence of random effects and to overcome the limitations
of the frequentist approach. We consider a parametric Bayesian MLM (Goldstein, 2011), as a
particular case of the more general Bayesian multinomial mixed Logit model proposed in Nava
et al. (2016).2
With respect to the standard frequentist approach, that directly estimates model parame-
ters, Bayesian methods assign a probability distribution to such parameters, namely the prior
distribution, which embodies the available prior information. After data observation (modeled
via the likelihood function), the updated prior knowledge results in a posterior distribution on
which the Bayesian estimations are obtained (see Appendix C for further details on Bayesian
methods). Therefore, while in the frequentist approach parameters are considered unknown
but are fixed, in the Bayesian framework they are treated as random variables. The Bayesian
approach has several desirable properties. Firstly, a Bayesian MLM increases flexibility, com-
putational tractability and estimation accuracy with respect to the classic MLM, even if it does
not allow a formal distinction between fixed and random effects since they are all endowed with
suitable prior distributions.3 Secondly, estimators consistency and efficiency are attained under
1The MLM, with fixed and random effects, was first introduced and applied as the hedonic demand model
in Cardell and Dunbar (1980) and Boyd and Mellman (1980). Only at the end of the last century it became
popular in theoretical and applied economics, especially to model transport demand (Bolduc and Ben-Akiva,
1996; Brownstone and Train, 1998).
2Theoretical contributions on the Bayesian mixed Logit model can be found in the econometric and statistical
literature (see, among the others, for a comprehensive review Hensher and Greene, 2003; Train, 2001). Empirical
applications are, however, still limited. For instance, in Balcombe et al. (2009) the Bayesian MLM is used
to estimate the willingness-to-pay, in Choi et al. (2013) to estimate PC table demand, while in Rigby and
Burton Rigby and Burton (2006) to describe food attribute preferences. For a multivariate application to author
identification see Madigan et al. (2005).
3To the best of our knowledge, Nava et al. (2016) is the first application which compares Bayesian and classical
estimations in an extension of the MLM. Alternatively, random coefficients can be considered as a part of the



































































milder conditions. Thirdly, the (quasi) complete separation issue,4 that often occurs in discrete
choice models when random effects with a high number of levels (e.g. the household id) are
included5, is bypassed via the parameter priors elicitation.6
Specifically, the adopted Bayesian MLM assumes (multivariate) normal prior distributions
for fixed and random effect model parameters. We enrich this hierarchy (Goldstein, 2011) by
assigning an Inverse-Wishart (IW) prior distribution to the random effect covariance matrix.7
We select non-informative priors for all model parameters, with a large variance to reflect the
relative lack of confidence about the mean assumed for the fixed and random effect priors
(Finch et al., 2014). However, sampling from the resulting posterior distribution (eq. (3) in
Appendix C) under these assumptions and obtaining marginal posterior distributions require
further techniques. Thus, our estimations are based on the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
method with a block Gibbs sampler algorithm (Casella and George, 1992), used in the Bayesian
inference to update model parameters with a level of efficiency and computation tractability
that is higher than the general Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (Hadfield, 2010). The block Gibbs
sampler easily approximates the properties of the marginal posterior distributions by sampling
from the conditional posterior distribution of each model parameter (eq. (3) in Appendix C) at
the cost of a substantial increase in computing time.
Finally, model selection is done via the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), in the frequentist
framework, and via the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC), an approximation of a penalized
loss function for a given deviance, in the Bayesian one. Formally, the DIC is a generalization of
the AIC and it is used when MCMC simulations are required, as in this case. As in the AIC,
the DIC minimum value signals the model with the best performance.
4Quasi complete separation issue results in the non-convergence of the Newton Raphson method in MLM
estimates (Cox, 1989)
5Allison (2008), Altman et al. (2003), and Lesaffre and Albert (1989)
6Note that in any logistic regression model the log-likelihood function is globally concave, therefore the function
can have at most one global maximum. Even if the logistic regression model has no local maxima issue due to
a globally concave likelihood function (Amemiya, 1985), it might still happen that the latter has no maximum.
This occurs when the choice probability is nearly perfectly predicted by a covariate or a linear combination of
covariates (Webb et al., 2004). In other words, this often results in a complete or quasi-complete separation
problem, implying that the maximum likelihood estimate does not exist. This problem, that is common to a
wide range of empirical analyses based on a binary response variable, cannot be solved by increasing the number
of iterations or by arbitrarily remove predictors to obtain an identifiable model (Zorn, 2005).
7Even if some other less informative priors than the IW can be considered (see, e.g. McCulloch and Rossi,
2000), the selection of an IW satisfactorily deals with complete separation problems while preserving invariance
principles and, therefore, reducing estimation complexity. Moreover, such a prior is a multivariate generalization




































































5 Switching behavior in the Italian electricity market
We apply this econometric model to the analysis of switching in the Italian retail electricity
market. In accordance with the EU energy directives,8 Italy began electricity-market liberaliza-
tion in 1999 (Legislative Decree 1999, n. 799), with the progressive unbundling of its national
vertically integrated monopoly (Enel) and the consequent development of competitive wholesale
and retail markets.
The process was completed with the deregulation of the retail market for domestic con-
sumers, inaugurated on 1st July 2007 and subjected to temporary regulation until 1st July 2020
(the deadline was initially set to 1st July 2019 by the Law 4th August 2017, n. 12410 and
then postponed by the Law 25th July 2018, n. 9111). Under temporary regulation, domestic
consumers may opt for a supplier on the free market or for a national electricity contract, the
so-called “maggior tutela”, regulated by the Italian regulatory authority for energy, networks
and environment (Autorità di Regolazione per Energia Reti e Ambiente, ARERA12). In this
kind of contracts electricity is often supplied by the local distributor system operator (DSO)
that acts as a local monopolist. Tariffs depend on the fluctuations in the wholesale markets and
are updated quarterly by the energy regulatory agency. Customers that do not take action are
assigned to the regulated service that, in 2013, still included 71.2% of domestic consumers.
As for the supply side of the market, the number of operators has been growing since
2007. The number of active groups rose from 219 in 2012 to 260 in 2013. For what concerns
the number of retailers, 136 subjects operate on the regulated market, 3 in the safeguarded
categories market, and 336 in the free market. With respect to 2012 the total number of
operators has grown by 50 units.13 In 2013, the main operator controlled about half of market
sales, and the first three operators (CR3) delivered 72.4% of energy volumes (AEEGSI, 2015).14
Domestic households that have opted for the free market pay a price higher than the one
they would pay on the regulated market, with an increase that varies from 15% to 20% (with





12Previously named AEEGSI (Autorità per l’Energia Elettrica il Gas e il Sistema Idrico), until 27th December
2017. Documents published by the authority before 2017 are therefore referenced as AEEGSI.
13All the new entrants operate on the free market (AEEGSI, 2014). In 2016 the number of active groups was
373 (ARERA, 2017).
14The Herfindahl index is 2810 (AEEGSI, 2014). In 2016 the concentration rate was 69.9% (ARERA, 2017).



































































reference to procurement costs only). This is in line with the findings of studies that report
that households remain largely unaffected by the liberalization of retail markets or face higher
power rates (Concettini and Créti, 2013; Defeuilley, 2009; Ghazvini et al., 2016; Joskow, 2000;
Steiner, 2004).15 Higher energy prices cannot be explained solely by the provision of accessory
services, since there is no conclusive evidence on the diffusion of new services especially for
domestic consumers (Fehr and Hansen, 2010). In Italy, for 2013, the official comparison tool
(TrovaOfferte16) reported only 30 offers. The figure seems surprisingly low in comparison to
the number of active operators in the sector.
6 Data
The data set is based on the Aspects of Daily Life survey (ADL), carried out in 2014 by the
Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). We observe social, demographic, geographic
and economic information regarding 18,448 households and 37,217 individuals in working age
or retired. In addition, the survey provides information about individual opinions, expecta-
tions, and choices regarding national utilities. For what concerns electricity and gas, it collects
information on customer satisfaction, switching behavior, and electricity usage.17 The survey
provides data on both households and individuals. Individual information is provided for all
household components. For detailed descriptive statistics see Tables 2 and 3.
In the ADL survey, information is collected for general purposes, and therefore, with respect
to works that rely on ad hoc surveys, the data do not suffer from framing effects. In addition,
the survey is carried out via paper questionnaires, thereby avoiding the self-selection generated
by the use of web surveys.18 The data set also includes an index of market concentration (CR3,
i.e. the sum of the market shares of the three largest firms on the relevant market) computed
on data from ARERA.
Our data do not include prices. This limitation afflicts many of the studies on the topic
reflecting the lack of data and, possibly, the resistance of retailers in disclosing the conditions of
their offers. However, as discussed in Section 2, the importance of price in electricity switching
15Hilke (2008)’s analysis of the U.S. electricity market describes similar patterns.
16Currently the official comparison tool is Portale Offerte.
17The same data have been used by Quaglione et al. (2017) in an analysis on energy-saving behavior.
18Web survey are effective, fast and cheap ways to obtain data. However, since switching crucially depends
on the accessibility of information that is increasingly conveyed by the Internet, conducting a web survey is very
likely to result in a biased sample. Yang (2014, p. 408) explicitly acknowledge the problem in commenting his
analysis: “The sample is slightly biased toward the young, highly educated and higher incomes. These biases are



































































is controversial and so is the very effect of liberalization on the level of prices. Morey and Kirsch
(2016) provide evidence that price regulation and the opening of retail markets do not seem to
have had a significant impact on average residential prices in the EU and that the price impacts
on the choice of the retailer are likely to be swamped by other factors (Table 1). Prices seem
to be more important for industrial and large commercial customers that are more attractive
to retailers (Morey and Kirsch, 2016). The absence of information on prices in the database, in
any case, does not weaken our analysis, whose objective is to investigate the other determinants
of switching behaviour in the Italian electricity market.
Table 2: Here
Table 3: Here
6.1 Variables and preliminary analysis
The information of interest for our analysis is grouped in individual, household and market
variables.
Individual variables characterize family members and highlight differences among house-
holds. They provide information on gender, age, education level, and use of the Internet.
Household variables include: household characteristics (number of members, age of con-
tact person and perception of income affluence), geographic information (municipality size and
region), electricity and gas related variables (electricity and gas switch together with information
on the service provision). We consider the age of the contact person and the number of members
to investigate different levels of consumption and economic burden. We pair this information
with the size of the municipality in which the family lives and its geographic location.
The economic status of the household is captured by its satisfaction with its economic
resources. This variable captures the perception of income affluence: the same level of income
can be perceived as satisfactory in a relatively frugal community or as inadequate in a glamorous
city. Moreover, perceived values indirectly capture individual diversity. Again, a given level of
income could make one’s life perceived as secure or insecure depending on his/her past history
and personal attitudes.



































































(bills, contracts and services), and household electricity and gas switching between July 2007
and the end of January 2014. Note that these switching rates refer to cumulative switches over
seven years. This underestimates actual switching rates from regulated to free markets since
respondents were asked if they had switched at least once in the previous seven years. Moreover,
they do not account for multiple switching and they also include switches from the free to the
regulated market.
Finally, the structure of the market is described by the local electricity (domestic and
non-domestic) retail market concentration (W CR3), calculated as the sum of the market shares
of the first three electricity retailers in each region (NUTS 2). Concentration should reflect the
number of available options for consumers.
A preliminary analysis of the distribution of these variables across the Italian regions (NUTS
2) gives some insights on the electricity market and on consumers attitudes. Electricity and
gas (cumulative) switching rates are unevenly distributed across regions, with a prevalence of
switching in the Northern regions (Figure 2). Overall, as reported in Table 3, the switching rate
is relatively low (7.61% for electricity, 2.12% for gas, and 7.46% for electricity and gas) despite
the high level of consumer awareness with respect to other EU countries. Consumer awareness,
defined as the knowledge of opportunities, rights, and tools that empower them to participate
in the retail market (e.g. to switch product or supplier, to install a self-generation facility or
similar) (CEER, 2015, p. 9), in the database is about 85%, whereas in Denmark consumers
awareness was estimated around 50% in 2013 (Yang, 2014) and 83% in UK in 2010 (Iovino,
2015). In addition, the majority of respondents in the sample declare a high level of satisfaction
about the information provided on service provision (about 61%) and on bill comprehensibility
(about 62%) (Table 3).
The relationship between retailer choice and customer satisfaction is not very clear. Morey
and Kirsch (2016) and Shin and Managi (2017) find a positive relation while, in our case, the as-
sociation is strongly negative (Figure 1). The heterogeneity of behaviors and perceptions across
the Italian territory shown in Figure 2 are confirmed by Figure 3. In particular, the geographic
distribution of satisfaction concerning economic resources reflects the economic divide between




































































satisfaction about provided information (Figure 3b) and in the use of the Internet (Figure 3c).
For what concerns the market structure, the data reveal a heterogeneous mapping of the






According to the approach illustrated in Section 4, we estimate the model described in eq. (1).
Table 5 reports the estimates of switching determinants at the household level (HH), apply-
ing the proposed parametric Bayesian MLM.
Similarly to Rowlands et al. (2004), we find that the age negatively affects switching, whereas
gender is irrelevant (as in He and Reiner, 2015). Differently from findings in the surveyed litera-
ture (Ek and Söderholm, 2008; He and Reiner, 2015; McDaniel and Groothuis, 2012; Rowlands
et al., 2004), the level of education has no effect on switching. An increase in the number
of household members, a proxy for the amount of energy consumption and bills, increments
the switching probability. The estimated value can be interpreted as an attempt to save on
electricity bills.
Local differences are included via geographic indicators (NUTS1) and via the introduction
of local covariates, such as municipality size and regional retail market concentration (W CR3
calculated at the NUTS2 level). Living in municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants
has a negative effect on switching. This contradicts the findings of Shin and Managi (2017),
who find more participation in large cities and attribute the result to the presence of a higher
number of retailers and to better customer support services. A previous evidence (Waddams
Price et al., 2013) suggests that the value of an individual’s time may differ in communities of
different dimensions. Typically, metropolitan areas are busier and people tend to attach a higher




































































social networks might be tighter in smaller community, thus making the flow of information and
contagion effects more likely.
The household geographic location results in differentiated switching rates as assumed in
our Hypothesis II. With respect to North-Western Italy, being located in Southern Italy has a
negative effect on the switching probability, whereas being located in the Islands has a positive
effect mainly driven by Sardinia.
Satisfaction with the economic resources of the household reduces the probability of switch-
ing. This suggests both that incentives to save are less stringent for wealthier households and
that they tend to attach a higher value to their time so that the search for better options
becomes more costly (Waddams Price et al., 2013).
The level of satisfaction with the information on the electricity service has a negative effect
on switching probability, showing that a more transparent contract increases the loyalty of
consumers for their current retailer. More frequent access to the Internet corresponds to a
higher probability of switching. The frequency of use of the Internet reflects access to a general
source of information (i.e. not limited to contract and service) and the attitude – i.e. frequency
– towards information seeking. Accessing the Internet not only provides information on the
service but also enriches consumer awareness about forthcoming reforms in the sector, political
or environmental issues. At the same time, accessing the Internet increases the exposure to
advertisements inserted in contexts that are not related to the search of information on electricity
provision.
The estimates confirm that switching is affected by the structure of the market (Hypothesis
I). The electricity switching rate is strongly related to the gas switching rate. The estimated
coefficient captures a twofold phenomenon. First, on the supply side, it shows that horizontally
integrated firms experience an advantage in that they can propose joint switching and exploit
the spillovers of joint marketing campaigns. Secondly, on the demand side, it shows that,
if sequential switching is taken into account, once the consumer has switched retailer in one
market, he/she may apply the same decision process to other services due to a learning effect
and/or because the perceived switching costs are lower. Moreover, as assumed in the research






































































In order to further investigate the presence of local effects on the switching probability, we
also apply a Bayesian MLM for each of the three main Italian macro-regions.19 Table 6 shows
that in different institutional frameworks households and individuals behave differently, i.e. the
determinants of switching and the intensity of their effect vary in space (Hypothesis II).
Gender remains unimportant for Northern Italy and Southern Italy while females are slightly
more likely to switch than men in Central Italy, and possessing a graduate degree has a relevant
negative effect only in the North. This information is quite interesting and would require further
investigation. It could imply that having higher education leads to a better understanding of
the functioning of the market and, therefore, a negative impact would witness for a sort of
disillusion about real potential gains from switching. In Northern and Central Italy, economic
resources do not impact on the switching decision whereas the variable is important in the
Southern part of the country and impacts negatively on switching. The level of satisfaction
with the provided information is associated with higher inertia in Northern and Central Italy,
while it is unimportant in the South. The size of the municipality is relevant only in the South.
Finally, the number of family members is more relevant in Central and Southern Italy.
To test the hypothesis that the definition of the household matters to the analysis of switch-
ing determinants and that the household is more accurately described as the bundle of the
features of its members (Hypothesis III), in Table 7 we report the estimation conducted with
the traditional Logit methodology at the household level (HCP).
In these models, we find no effect of the municipality size and of the market concentration
rate. We therefore conclude that, in addition to the ability of incorporating individual variables
in the analysis, the HH definition also enriches the identification of determinants.
On the methodological side, the Bayesian approach produces more accurate estimates than
the classical one (see Nava et al., 2016). However, due to the quasi-complete separation problem
and to the introduction of the extra variability associated with household heterogeneity, it is
not possible to directly compare confidence and credibility intervals of the point estimates,




































































respectively shown in Table 7 and 5.20 We, therefore, indirectly compare them via forest plots
in Figure 5, where a set of household variables is represented. The Bayesian estimates are
consistent with the classic ones and the Bayesian method results in tighter credibility intervals,
hence in a higher estimate accuracy.21
8 Discussion and concluding remarks
Results shed light on the switching decision in general and in the Italian retail electricity market.
We have shown that the structure of the market affects the decision of switching (Hypothesis
I). Market concentration reduces the scope for competition and acts negatively on the benefits
the household can obtain from switching.
In Italy, there has been a steady growth of the number of operators since 2007. The increase
in potential competition, however, is harmed by the presence of big players such as the previous
monopolist Enel, by a high national market concentration, and by the presence of the temporary
regulated service that attracts the majority of consumers. Policies that operate on the supply
side of the market should promote competition and eliminate the coexistence of the regulated
and the free market. The hybrid solution was initially thought as a temporary regime to obtain
a smooth transition to the free market. However, it has been repeatedly extended and is now
in place until July 2020.
In addition, results show that households which have switched retailer either in the gas or
in the electricity market are more likely to switch also in the other market. Therefore, policies
that attract the interest on switching in one market are likely to produce positive effects on
the switching rate in the other. From the viewpoint of contracts, offering the joint switching of
gas and electricity would result in higher switching. It is worth noting that this would generate
a competitive advantage for horizontally integrated retailers. The role of joint switching is
relevant also for the Italian gas retail market which is characterized by a lower switching rate
20The classic approach assumes that there are fixed and unique model parameter values and, to make inferences
on them, experiments are conducted so that a confidence interval is constructed to express knowledge uncertainty
after the experiment. The Bayesian approach assumes fixed effects endowed with a suitable prior. It follows
that credibility intervals have fixed bounds and random estimated parameters. Confidence intervals treat the
estimated value as fixed and the bounds as random variables, without incorporating prior knowledge. Forest
plots (or Blobbograms), which are frequently used in meta-analysis, are used here to compare method and model
accuracy (see, among the others, Nava et al., 2016).
21The constant and the gas switch estimates are omitted for plot scale reasons, but the statistical evidence is



































































than the electricity market (in our data 9.5% over seven years vs. 15% of the electricity market)
in spite of higher associated savings and of higher expenditure.22
An additional interesting feature of the Italian market is that the switching choice takes
place in a heterogeneous cultural, geographic and economic context. Our estimates show that
switching determinants differ across macro-regions (Hypothesis II). In Italy, households that
live in the South switch less than those living in the North-West. Moreover, economic resources
play a (negative) role in the switching decision only in Southern Italy, age is only important
in Northern Italy whereas gender matters only in the Centre. As for education, having a high-
school degree increases switching activities in Southern Italy and whereas in the North having a
degree decreases the switching probability. The main implication of these findings is that even
if countries have similar stated policy goals, i.e. achieving an efficient liberalized electricity
market (also) through high switching rates, the instruments deployed to achieve these goals
should be sufficiently differentiated to reflect the countries’ distinct situation and their within
country heterogeneity. There is no “one-size-fits-all” policy instrument (Monarca et al., 2015)
and further effort should be dedicated to the selection of an optimal scale of analysis. For
instance, the access to the Internet has a positive effect in all the macro-regions but its level
varies in the Italian territory (Figure 3c). While policy imposes the presence of an official website
to compare offers, our results suggest that granting more access to the Internet would promote
switching activities. Accessing the Internet allows to broaden the search for information and
to increase awareness of consumers about the trends of the relevant market and the available
contracts and offers.
A further source of heterogeneity in the analysis of switching determinants resides in the
composition of the households. We explore its implication by defining the household as the
bundle of the features of its members (HH). This specification of household proves useful in
identifying determinants that could not be included in the traditional approach (for instance
the use of the Internet as an individual variable) and in enriching the analysis of switching
behavior. Namely, the effect of economic resources was unimportant when adopting the HCP
definition (Hypothesis III). Moreover, the effects of the concentration of the market and of
the size of the municipality of residence on switching probability are found only when family
heterogeneity is accounted for.
22The maximum saving associated with fixed-price offers, calculated on spring data, was about AC130 before tax
per year in 2013. For gas provision, the maximum saving, under the same conditions, was about AC260 (AEEGSI,



































































The results obtained for the Italian market support our research hypotheses and suggest
that the aspects included in our analysis and our methodology can improve the analysis of
switching behavior in other markets.
A thorough understanding of the switching decision has implications that go beyond the
knowledge of the process itself since the European Union relies on switching rates, among the
other indexes (e.g. barriers to entry, innovation, price dispersion), to assess the success of the
liberalization of markets. Given the uncertainty on the actual benefits the liberalization has
brought to households (Concettini and Créti, 2013; Dyner and Larsen, 2001; Fehr and Hansen,
2010; Özbuğday et al., 2016; Vihalemm and Keller, 2016) the identification of the appropriate
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A Methodological approaches in literature
Table 8: Here
B Logit and Mixed Logit models
The (discrete) switching choice is driven by a utility maximization process (random utility
model). We represent the decision of household i (∀ i = 1, . . . , n) as the choice of j among a
choice set composed of the two alternatives: j ∈ {S,NS}, i.e. switch (j = S) and non-switch
(j = NS). Hence, the switching response of the ith household, i.e. Yi, is a binary random
variable equal to 1 if the household switches and equal to 0 if it does not switch.
By selecting the alternative Yi = j, the decision maker i will obtain a utility, Uij , modeled
as a random variable with a systematic (observed), Vij , and a stochastic (unobserved), εij ,
component, i.e. Uij = Vij + εij . Therefore, the household i will select the alternative Yi = 1
if and only if Ui1 > Ui0, where Ui0 is the utility associated with the non switch option. We
assume standard Gumbel independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) errors, derived as a
particular parametrisation of the generalized extreme value distribution. This assumption allows
to derive a Logit model starting from the Random Utility theory (see, among the others, Train,
2003). Given the heavy tails of the Gumbel distribution, we obtain a better model household
choices. Its use is close to assuming independent normal errors, except that the heavy tails
allow more robust analyses taking into account a “slightly more aberrant behavior than the
normal” (Train, 2003, p. 39). The systematic component of the utility is assumed to be linear
in model parameters, i.e. Vij = x
′
ij β. Hence, the switching probability reduces to








where xi1 represents the p × 1 vector of observed explanatory variables (for individual i and
choice j = 1) and β is a p×1 vector of fixed effects (here with p−1 covariates and an intercept).
For the ease of exposition, we do not report the j ∈ {0, 1} alternative indicator in the rest of
the discussion.



































































to correctly account for the household member characteristics. Formally, this results in the
following specification. Let Ykr be the common response variable of individual r in the household
k for r = 1, . . . , Rk with Rk the number of members of household k, k = 1, . . . ,K. Moreover,
xkr represents the vector of the values of individual level explanatory variables, for fixed effect
model parameters β. In our case, we assume only a random intercept, i.e a univariate random
effect uk, following Goldstein (2011) and Nava et al. (2016) to suitably model the common
individual choice in the household and its heterogeneity. Therefore, the error components uk is
common to all Rk household members, i.e. Vkr = x
′









C The parametric Bayesian MLM
Bayesian methods allows to specify prior information via the selection of a prior distribution π(θ)
for the unknown model parameters θ. After data observation, based on the likelihood function
L(Y|θ), the updated prior knowledge results in a posterior distribution π(θ|Y) ∝ L(Y|θ)π(θ),
on which the Bayesian estimations θ̂ are determined, i.e.
θ̂ =
∫
θ π(θ|Y ) dθ.
The parametric Bayesian MLM, with model parameters θ = (β,u) (Goldstein, 2011), is a
particular case of the more general Bayesian multinomial mixed Logit model proposed in Nava
et al. (2016). Normal prior distributions are assumed for fixed (β) and random (u) effect model




u). We assign an IW































































































Where M and I are the Inverse-Wishart parameters and S = (u− µu)(u− µu)T /N .
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• Switching determinants depend on the context of choice
• Bayesian econometric analysis explains switching probability at the individual
and household level
• The structure of the market affects the switching decision
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Figure 2: Electricity and/or gas switching rates at the regional (NUTS2)




















(c) Frequent use of the
Internet
[41.18% - 55.41%]
Figure 3: Economic resources, information quality and quantity variables at





Figure 4: Retail market concentration at regional (NUTS2) level [31.4% -
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Figure 5: Comparison between Bayesian mixed Logit and Bayesian (house-
hold) Logit estimates (Tables 5 and 7). Forest plots report, respectively,
credibility intervals (circle) and confidence intervals (rhombus) for selected
household variables. The box size is based on estimate precision. Source:
our elaboration (ADL 2014)
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Table(s)







Electricity Price +,= Giulietti, Waterson, et al. (2014),
Klemperer (1995), Sirin and Gonul
(2016), and Wieringa and Verhoef
(2007).
Switching costs - Sirin and Gonul (2016) and Wieringa
and Verhoef (2007).
Income +,- Ek and Söderholm (2008), Fontana
et al. (2018), Gamble et al. (2009),
Giulietti, Waddams Price, et al. (2005),
and Rowlands et al. (2004).
Demographic
Age -, = Fontana et al. (2018), He and Reiner
(2015), and Rowlands et al. (2004).
Gender + (Male), = Gamble et al. (2009)
Education + Ek and Söderholm (2008), He and
Reiner (2015), McDaniel and Groothuis
(2012), and Rowlands et al. (2004).
Psychological
Loyalty - Daglish (2016), Gamble et al. (2009),
and Szymanski and Henard (2001).
Risk aversion - Schleich et al. (2017) and Sirin and
Gonul (2016).
Satisfaction - Keaveney (1995), Wieringa and Verhoef
(2007), and Yang (2014).
Learning + Defeuilley (2009), Fontana et al. (2018),
Giulietti, Waddams Price, et al. (2005),
McDaniel and Groothuis (2012), and
Wirtz et al. (2014).
Information
Service and Contract + Flores and Waddams Price (2018),
Fontana et al. (2018), Gärling et al.
(2008), He and Reiner (2015), Hortaçsu
et al. (2015), and Loi and Le Ng (2018).
Other
Green energy + Gärling et al. (2008), Sauthoff et al.
(2017), and Shin and Managi (2017).
Political Elections + He and Reiner (2015).









Table 2: Descriptive statistics: individual and household variables. Source: our elaboration (ADL 2014)
Individual variables N % Household variables N %
Sex Number of members
Male 21115 48.47 1 5613 30.43
Female 22452 51.53 2 5257 28.5
Age 3 3654 19.81
Not in working age(<16) 6350 14.58 4 3000 16.26
In working age(16-64) 27253 62.55 5+ 924 5.01
Retired(>64) 9964 22.87 Size of municipality
Education (over 16) Metropolitan area 3788 20.53
University 4657 12.51 More than 10000 inhab. 8227 44.6
High school 13314 35.78 Less than 10000 inhab. 6433 34.87
Secondary school 11452 30.77 Geographical area (NUTS1)
Primary school 6334 17.02 North-Western Italy 4156 22.53
No education 1460 3.92 North-Eastern Italy 4002 21.69
Employment status (over 16) Central Italy 3282 17.79
Employed 15158 40.73 Southern Italy 5104 27.67
Job-seeker 4448 11.95 Insular Italy 1904 10.32
Housewife 5432 14.59 Economic resources
Student 2727 7.33 Excellent 161 0.87
Retired 8358 22.46 Good 9831 53.29
Other 1094 2.94 Insufficient 7216 39.12
Use of the Internet (over 16) Absolutely insufficient 1240 6.72
Frequent 19185 51.55
Occasional 18032 48.45
Table 3: Descriptive statistics: electricity-related variables. Source: our elaboration (ADL 2014)
Electricity variables N %
Satisfaction with services provided
Very satisfied 3087 16.75
Quite satisfied 13100 71.09
Unsatisfied 1798 9.76
Very unsatisfied 443 2.4
Satisfaction with bill comprehensibility
Very satisfied 2102 11.46
Quite satisfied 9216 50.22
Unsatisfied 5198 28.33
Very unsatisfied 1834 9.99
Satisfaction with information provided
Very satisfied 1838 10.07
Quite satisfied 9242 50.66
Unsatisfied 5299 29.05
Very unsatisfied 1865 10.22




Only electricity 1404 7.61
Only gas 391 2.12
Electricity and gas 1376 7.46
None 15277 82.81
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Table 4: Variables description
Dependent variable
Electricity retailer switch Dummy variable: 1 for families that switched




Female Dummy variable: 1 for female
Over65 Dummy variable: 1 for individuals with age > 65
Degree Dummy variable: 1 for individuals with a univer-
sity degree as highest educational level
Diploma Dummy variable: 1 for individuals with a diploma
as highest educational level
Frequent Internet user Dummy variable: 1 for individuals that navigate
the Internet more than once a week
Household
Over65 CP Dummy variable: 1 for contact person with age
> 65
Nb members Number of family members
Inhab Categorical variable: municipality size, with lev-
els Metropolitan Area, < 10000 inhabitants, >
10000 inhabitants
Geo Categorical variable: geographical distribution
(NUTS1), with levels North-West, North-East,
Centre, South, Islands
Econ resources Dummy variable: 1 for satisfactory level of eco-
nomic resources
Sat info level Dummy variable: 1 for contact person that re-
ports having satisfactory information on electric-
ity service and provision
Gas retailer switch Dummy variable: 1 for families that switched gas
retailer between July 2007 - end of Jan 2014
Market
W CR3 Dummy variable: 1 for regional market con-
centration (CR3) > national weighted average
(weights = regional populations)
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Table 5: Bayesian mixed Logit model for the electricity retailer switch with individual and household specific
covariates (HH). Household id random intercepts. Naive standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable:
Electricity retailer switch
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual
Female 0.0407 −0.0297∗ 0.0293 0.0115
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0001)
Over65 0.0639∗∗∗ 0.0721 0.0782 0.0200
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0002)
Degree −0.0476 0.0871 0.1018∗ 0.0158
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0002)
Diploma −0.0182 0.1024∗∗ 0.0510 −0.0219
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0002)
Frequent Internet user 0.2501∗∗∗ 0.3173∗∗∗ 0.3320∗∗∗ 0.4251∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0001)
Household
Over65 CP −0.2243∗∗∗ −0.0929 −0.3083∗∗∗ −0.1299∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0004)
Nb members 0.1831∗∗∗ 0.1951∗∗∗ 0.2377∗∗∗ 0.1394∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Inhab <10000 0.1065∗∗ 0.1086∗ 0.1961∗∗ 0.0897
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0005)
Inhab >10000 −0.0901∗ −0.0171 −0.0497 −0.1256∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0005)
North-East −0.1233∗∗ −0.2329∗∗∗ −0.1120 −0.0838
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Centre 0.0987 −0.0621 0.0998 0.0380
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.010) (0.0006)
South −0.5686∗∗∗ −0.7553∗∗∗ −0.6130∗∗∗ −0.5199∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0007)
Islands 0.6093∗∗∗ 0.3543∗∗∗ 0.8259∗∗∗ 0.7152∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0009)
Econ resources −0.0111 −0.1771∗∗∗ −0.2279∗∗∗ −0.1167∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0004)
Sat info level −0.1875∗∗∗ −0.1862∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Gas retailer switch 5.5726∗∗∗ 5.7719∗∗∗ 7.0464∗∗∗ 5.5026∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Market
W CR3 −0.1592∗∗ −0.1246∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0004)
Constant −3.9992∗∗∗ −3.9459∗∗∗ −4.9494∗∗∗ −3.7150∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0001)
Observations 37,217 36,814 37,217 36,814
Deviance Inf. Crit. 11,708.950 11,590.080 10,576.810 10,565.40
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 6: Bayesian mixed Logit estimates of individual and household specific switching determinants (HH).
Analyses performed on the sub-populations of the North, Centre and South of Italy with household id random





Female 0.0104 0.0135∗ 0.1305
(0.0002) (0.0070) (0.0006)
Over65 0.2652∗∗∗ 0.3240 0.1989
(0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0008)
Degree −0.1084∗∗∗ 0.2168 0.3971
(0.0004) (0.0018) (0.0013)
Diploma 0.0497 0.3257 0.0108∗
(0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0005)
Frequent Internet user 0.5054∗∗∗ 0.5708∗∗∗ 0.5099∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0006)
Household
Over65 CP −0.1829∗∗∗ 0.6293 −0.1029∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0025) (0.0018)
Nb members 0.2639∗∗∗ 0.3682∗∗∗ 0.3709∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Inhab <10000 0.0084∗ 0.2944 0.5563
(0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0021)
Inhab >10000 −0.1808∗∗∗ 0.4192 −0.0132∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Econ resources 0.0331 0.417 −0.0271∗∗
(0.0006) (0.023) (0.0010)
Sat info level −0.3380∗∗∗ −0.2383∗∗∗ 0.1104
(0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0014)
Gas retailer switch 6.4952∗∗∗ 9.2044∗∗∗ 6.7528∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0066) (0.0020)
Constant −3.5080∗∗∗ −4.2560∗∗∗ −4.3193∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0051) (0.0045)
Observations 15,675 6,476 14,663
Deviance Inf. Crit. 4628.785 1699.528 3269.662
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 7: Estimates of the electricity retailer switch determinants with only household covariates (HCP).
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable:
Electricity retailer switch
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household
Over65 CP −0.256∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗ −0.258∗∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
Nb members 0.181∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Inhab <10000 0.077 0.085 0.083 0.092
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
Inhab >10000 −0.072 −0.069 −0.075 −0.073
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
North-East −0.115 −0.107 −0.094 −0.084
(0.077) (0.077) (0.080) (0.080)
Centre 0.021 −0.003 0.049 0.028
(0.079) (0.079) (0.084) (0.085)
South −0.561∗∗∗ −0.571∗∗∗ −0.519∗∗∗ −0.523∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.078) (0.090) (0.091)
Islands 0.424∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.087) (0.105) (0.106)
Econ resources −0.065 −0.050 −0.063 −0.048
(0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052)
Sat info level −0.175∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.052)
Gas retailer switch 3.680∗∗∗ 3.667∗∗∗ 3.676∗∗∗ 3.663∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
Market
W CR3 −0.060 −0.067
(0.065) (0.065)
Constant −2.615∗∗∗ −2.520∗∗∗ −2.608∗∗∗ −2.513∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.100) (0.095) (0.100)
Observations 18,448 18,244 18,448 18,244
Log Likelihood −5,616.710 −5,553.786 −5,616.277 −5,553.256
Akaike Inf. Crit. 11,255.420 11,131.570 11,256.560 11,132.510
McFadden 0.2818 0.2818 0.2809 0.2809
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 8: Methodological survey
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